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Abstract
This article estimates the impact of minimum sta¢ ng requirements on the nursing
home market using a unique national panel over the 1996-2005 period. This study
reveals that, given a half-hour increase in the minimum nursing hours per resident
day for licensed nurses, quality of patient care increases by 25 percent. This quality-
increasing e⁄ect is mainly driven by low-quality nursing homes increasing their quality
of care to meet the new standards. By contrast, minimum sta¢ ng requirements for
direct-care nurses do not have any signi￿cant impact on quality. This lack of impact
may be explained by nursing home providers circumventing this regulation by hiring
less expensive and less skilled laborers as substitutes for direct-care nurses.
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Government regulators, at both the federal and the state levels, have imposed minimum
quality standards (MQS) on the nursing home market in the U.S. The main objective of this
regulation is to reduce the ine¢ ciencies caused by asymmetric information, and to increase
the overall quality of patient care. Whether or not this goal has been achieved, and to what
degree, is an important research question given the aging population1 in the U.S. and the
widespread concern about the low quality of care in nursing home facilities. This article
is among the ￿rst to use a national panel to empirically examine the impact of minimum
sta¢ ng requirements on the supply and quality of patient care in the nursing home market.
MQS regulation has been used extensively in di⁄erent economic settings2 and its popular-
ity has generated a large research literature. Most of the research is dedicated to investigating
the regulatory impact that such regulation has had on social welfare, in terms of consumers￿
access to the regulated product as well as quality distribution in the regulated market. The-
oretical work on this subject tends to agree that MQS regulation has an entry deterrent
in￿ uence on the regulated market. They disagree, however, about the regulatory impact on
the distribution of quality and the subsequent in￿ uence on social welfare.3 Based on the
existing theories, MQS regulation has a distinct impact on the regulated market, depending
on di⁄erentials in the market structure, the elasticity of demand, the consumers￿sensitivity
to quality variations, and the marginal cost of providing quality. For example, in a market
where the cost of raising quality outweighs the willingness to pay for the majority of the
consumers, regulated ￿rms may exit the market and consumers may end up being worse o⁄.
1The older population - persons aged 65 or older - numbered 37.9 million in 2007, which represented
12.6 percent of the U.S. population, or over one in every eight Americans. By 2030, there will be about
72.1 million older persons, almost twice the number in 2007. In 2007, 4.4 percent (1.57 million) of the 65+
population lived in institutional settings such as nursing homes. The percentage increases dramatically with
age, ranging from 1.3 percent for persons 65-74 years to 4.1 percent for persons 75-84 years and 15.1 percent
for persons 85+ (Administration on Aging, 2008).
2For example, drugs must satisfy federal safety standards and members of many professions have to pass
state examinations and ful￿ll a series of requirements in order to be certi￿ed or licensed.
3Leland (1979), Shapiro (1986), Ronnen (1991), Crampes and Hollander (1995), Valletti (2000), Jinji and
Toshimitsu (2004).
1Moreover, the impact of MQS regulation may become further complicated if the regulation
imposes restrictions on inputs rather than on quality. If this proves to be the case, ￿rms will
comply in a manner that minimizes their costs in adhering to the regulation. For example,
a regulation which involves a minimum level of nursing hours per patient day will result in
nursing home providers circumventing this regulation by hiring less expensive and less skilled
nurses. In this scenario, nursing home providers ultimately sacri￿ce quality for quantity. As
a result, MQS regulation does not necessarily improve the quality of patient care. The com-
plexity inherent in theoretical predictions about the impact of MQS regulation has suggested
the necessity and the importance of empirical examinations. Previous studies have generally
focused on the number of regulated products or services.4 Thus, investigations about the
potential impact that such regulations could have on quality have been quite limited.5
One di¢ culty in engaging in empirical investigations of MQS regulation comes from data
constraints. Data on quality information are hard to obtain, especially in markets with
asymmetric information. Previous work in this area typically relies on inputs or outputs
alone as indicators of quality. This type of quality measure is problematic if it fails to
incorporate risk adjustments to account for heterogeneity across examined observations.6
However, the data required in order to ensure risk adjustments are rather di¢ cult to obtain
and are sometimes not available. In addition to the issue of quality measures, the lack
of variation in regulatory policies causes another problem. Previous studies have taken
advantage of policy variations across states, but they tend to ignore the endogeneity problem
4Wiggins (1981) shows that drug regulation reduces the rate of introduction into the market and R&D
spending. Carroll and Gaston (1981) ￿nd that licensing restrictions reduce the provision of seven professional
services, including dentists. Gormley (1991) shows that quality regulations reduce the number of child-care
centers. Lowenberg and Tinnin (1992) ￿nd that regulations are associated with lower levels of consumption
of child-care services.
5For example, Holen (1978) and Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) study restrictive dentist licensing and ￿nd
licensing increases quality of care. However, Carroll and Gaston (1981) show that licensing may reduce
quality. Several recent works have found mixed results using data from the U.S. childcare industry, such as
Chipty and Witte (1995), Chipty and Witte (1999), Hotz and Xiao (2005).
6Using the number of physician visits is an example of the output related quality measure, which may be
inappropriate without controlling for the sickness of patients.
2that states may self-select into regulatory policies. Quite a few recent studies7 have employed
panel data to correct for unobserved heterogeneity by using ￿xed e⁄ects. However, a more
sophisticated model may be preferred in order to address the potential presence of unobserved
heterogeneity of other sources.
The nursing home industry serves as an ideal setting to examine the causal e⁄ects of
minimum quality standards on market outcomes. One unique feature of this study is that
a panel of observations covering almost all the nursing homes in the U.S. is presented, and
the data span an extended time period (1996 to 2005). Quality information is drawn from
a federal nursing home survey based on professional survey teams￿assessments of both the
process and outcome of nursing home care; thus, this data source provides reliable and
valuable quality measures.8 Moreover, regulatory variations across states and over time are
observed, which help to provide precise estimates for the policy impacts of MQS regulation.
Any analysis of policy impacts raises the question of endogeneity. To take advantage of
this unique dataset, I adopt a speci￿cation which includes the lagged dependent variable as
an explanatory variable. Such a dynamic speci￿cation accounts for state dependence of the
dependent variables of my research interests, which proves to be relevant in the nursing home
industry given large adjustment costs associated with nursing homes￿quality investment
and their entry and exit behavior. Given the concern about inter-surveyor variations across
states and over time, I extend the basic speci￿cation by adding state speci￿c trends. This
speci￿cation allows each state to have its own time trend concerning the measure of quality.
It also controls for any additional source of heterogeneity that follows a time trend. As a
￿nal extension, the dynamic speci￿cation is estimated by including a policy lead dummy
variable that indicates whether any policy changes would be introduced in the subsequent
year. This provides a speci￿cation check for the endogeneity of policy changes.
7Currie and Hotz (2004), Hotz and Xiao (2005), Siebert and Graevenitz (2005), and Chen (2008).
8To be more speci￿c, a survey team follows the federal standards to evaluate each surveyed nursing home.
If the nursing home fails to meet any certain federal standard, one corresponding de￿ciency citation will be
issued. The quality measure of this study is based on the number of de￿ciency citations and the severity
level of each violation. A bigger number of de￿ciency citations and a higher level of violations indicate lower
quality of care.
3MQS regulation imposed in the nursing home industry typically revolves around require-
ments related to the minimum nursing hours per patient day that must be available to care
for patients in each facilities. As di⁄erent categories of nurses a⁄ect patient care in di⁄erent
ways (Grabowski, 2001b), regulatory impacts were examined separately for licensed nurses
and direct-care nurses. Based on the estimation generated from the dynamic speci￿cation,
it was revealed that minimum sta¢ ng requirements do not have any signi￿cant e⁄ect on
the number of nursing homes and on the total number of nursing beds in a market. This
result is contrary to previous ￿ndings discovered in relation to the child care industry (Gorm-
ley, 1991; Hotz and Xiao, 2005). Evidence that minimum sta¢ ng requirements for licensed
nurses increase demand from non-Medicaid patients was also obtained. In regard to policy
impacts on the quality of care, minimum sta¢ ng requirements for licensed nurses are shown
to improve quality. More speci￿cally, a half-hour increase in the minimum nursing hours per
resident day for licensed nurses increases quality by 25 percent. Evidence that this quality-
increasing e⁄ect is mainly driven by low-quality nursing homes improving their quality to
meet the new standards is also presented. In contrast to the quality-increasing impact of the
sta¢ ng requirements for licensed nurses, no evidence that minimum sta¢ ng requirements
for direct-care nurses have any signi￿cant impact on the quality of care was detected. This
lack of impact may be explained by nursing home providers circumventing this regulation
by hiring less expensive and less skilled laborers as substitutes for direct-care nurses. Some
evidence is also presented.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the nursing
home industry. Section 3 explains the data and provides summary statistics. The model and
econometric speci￿cations are presented in Section 4, and the empirical results are discussed
in Section 5. Section 6 explains the lack of impact from regulations on direct-care nurses.
The last section concludes this study.
42 The Nursing Home Industry
A nursing home is a place of residence for people who require constant nursing and assistance
with activities of daily living. The majority of nursing home residents are the elderly.9 The
probability that an individual will use nursing home care is quite substantial.10 In 2007,
more than 1.4 million people, mostly seniors, lived in nearly 16,500 nursing homes nationwide
(American Health Care Association, 2007). The cost of nursing home care has been rising
over the years.11 The United States spent $131.3 billion in 2007 on nursing home care, as
opposed to $90 billion in 1999.
Nursing home care is primarily paid for by three sources: Medicare, Medicaid, and private
sources. Medicare is a government health insurance plan for all eligible individuals aged 65
years and older.12 Between 2001 and 2007, Medicare paid for an average of 12 percent of
all nursing home residents.13 Medicaid is a welfare program jointly funded by the state and
federal governments but is largely administered by the state.14 Medicaid pays for 65 percent
of the residents. As government sources pay for the majority of nursing home residents, it is
plain to see how intimately involved the government is with the industry. Private sources,
as well as others, pay for the remaining 23 percent of nursing home residents. The price of
nursing home care varies based on its payment sources. Nursing homes charge private-pay
patients what the market will bear, and they get reimbursed at a speci￿c rate set by the state
9Only about 10 percent of the residents are under the age of 65 (Decker, 2005). To be more speci￿c, nursing
home residents include the elderly with chronic disabilities; infants with multiple impairments; young adults
with traumatic brain injuries, or other physical disabilities; and individuals with short-term rehabilitation
or sub-acute treatment needs.
10Brown and Finkelstein (2008) reviewed a number of studies about nursing home utilization and found
that the probability that a 65-year-old individual will enter a nursing home at some point in his life ranges
from 35 to nearly 50 percent.
11Nursing home costs accounted for about 70 percent of the long-term care expenditure, which comprised
about 1.2 percent of GDP in 2004.
12Medicare nursing home coverage is quite limited. To qualify for Medicare nursing home coverage, an
individual must spend at least 3 full days in a hospital before entering a nursing home. Medicare only covers
nursing care up to 100 days. The ￿rst 20 days of nursing care will be fully covered by Medicare and a
co-payment will be charged for the remaining 80 days. The average paid Medicare nursing home stay was
23 days in 1997, only 1/5 of the allowable time.
13These ￿gures and ￿gures below are based on various reports from the American Health Care Association.
14To qualify for Medicaid, the potential recipients must pass a means test - their income and assets must
be lower than a certain level as determined by the individual state.
5and federal governments for Medicare and Medicaid patients. The Medicaid reimbursement
rate is generally 20 to 30 percent lower than the non-Medicaid (private-pay and Medicare)
price.
There has been widespread concern about nursing home residents receiving low quality
of care (General Accounting O¢ ce, 1998, 1999 and 2003; Institute of Medicine, 2001; Mullan
and Harrington, 2001; Grabowski, 2004; Wiener et al. 2007). In response, the state and
federal governments have put continuing e⁄orts to improve the quality of patient care. Back
in 1986, the Institute of Medicine published its landmark report that called for major revi-
sions in the way nursing home quality was monitored. Following that, the Congress passed
the Nursing Home Reform Amendment (NHRA) to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA) in 1987.15 This amendment mandated new standards of care, including increased
minimum sta¢ ng regulations and monitoring of the quality of care (Harrington and Carrillo,
1999). For example, the NHRA requires Medicare and/or Medicaid certi￿ed nursing homes
to have: "a RN (registered nurse) director of nursing; a RN on duty at least 8 hours a day,
7 days a week; a licensed nurse on duty the rest of the time; and a minimum of 75 hours of
training for nurse￿ s aides." The law also requires nursing homes "to provide su¢ cient sta⁄
and services to attain or maintain the highest possible level of physical, mental, and psycho-
logical well being of each resident" (OBRA, 1987). The total licensed nursing requirements
converted to hours per resident day (HPRD) in a facility with 100 beds are around 0.30
HPRD (Harrington, 2001).
Besides the federal regulations which enforce these minimum nurse sta¢ ng requirements,
most states have imposed additional requirements. The highest overall sta¢ ng requirement
was adopted by California, which requires 3.2 nursing hours per resident day, excluding
administrative nurses (Harrington, 2001). Regulations on minimum nurse sta¢ ng set re-
strictions on nursing inputs. Given the complexity of the production of nursing home care,
it is not clear whether increasing the quantity of nursing inputs will ultimately improve
15Due to extended negotiations with the nursing home industry, OBRA 1987 did not take e⁄ect till 1995,
8 years after the passage of the law (Wiener et al. 2007).
6the quality of care. For example, a nursing home may comply in a manner that minimizes
its operational costs by hiring less skilled and less expensive laborers. Such a move will
certainly depend on the availability of labor substitute for regulated nurses. If labor substi-
tution proves to be the case in the nursing home market, an additional hour of nursing input
will not necessarily produce better quality of care. In this sense, mandating the quantity of
nursing input does not necessarily guarantee the quality of care.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this study comes from three sources: (1) state regulatory policies, (2) the
1996 through 2005 Online Survey, Certi￿cation, and Reporting (OSCAR) ￿les and (3) the
2004 Area Resource File (ARF) and the most recent U.S. Population Census. Consistent with
previous work, the county is de￿ned as a proxy for the nursing home market.16 The county
may be a reasonable approximation of the market for nursing home care, given the patterns
of funding and resident origin (Gertler, 1989).17 This section explains each component of
the data and provides descriptive statistics.
3.1 Nursing Home Regulations on Minimum Nurse Sta¢ ng
Data on statutes and regulations is mainly collected from previous literature.18 Some recent
updates on regulations are obtained via the Internet.
A Medicare and/or Medicaid certi￿ed nursing home has to meet the minimum sta¢ ng
levels set by the state and federal governments. The federal Nursing Home Reform Act, as
16Most studies have used the county as a proxy for the nursing home market (e.g., Cohen and Spector,
1996; Nyman, 1985; Zinn, 1993).
17Gertler (1989) shows that 75 percent of nursing home residents in New York State had previously lived
in the county where the home was located. Nyman (1989) ￿nds 80 percent of residents in Wisconsin facilities
chose a nursing home located in the same county of residence. A more recent study by Mehta (2006) ￿nds
a strong inclination for residents to stay in a nursing home closer to their home. Simulation results suggest
that the county is a good proxy for the market and that all ￿rms within that area can be assumed to compete
equally (Mehta, 2006).
18The main data source includes Harrington (2001).
7part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, sets a minimum sta¢ ng level of
0.30 HPRD for licensed nurses, which is regarded as the lower bound of the regulation for
licensed nurses.
Most states have imposed additional requirements concerning minimum nursing stan-
dards. The description of these standards varies considerably across states. In order to
compare these standards, several steps have been taken. First, nursing standards are estab-
lished in various forms and standards di⁄er based on the size of the facility. For example,
California requires a total of 3.2 nursing hours per resident day while Maine maintains a
sta⁄-to-resident ratio of 1 to 5 during the day, 1 to 10 in the evening, and 1 to 15 at night.
In some cases, a ratio of sta⁄ to beds is used. For simplicity￿ s sake, I convert standards to
nursing hours per resident day for a 100-bed nursing facility.19 Second, standards may apply
only to one class of nursing personnel or to groups of personnel. Given that nurses of di⁄er-
ent categories may a⁄ect the quality of care di⁄erently, I divide nurses into two categories:
licensed nurses and direct-care nurses. Licensed nurses include registered nurses, licensed
practical nurses and licensed vocational nurses. Licensed nurses mainly play a supervisory
role such as supervising direct-care nurses, assessing residents￿health condition, developing
treatment plans and administering medications. Direct-care nurses include certi￿ed nursing
assistants, or nursing assistants who provide direct nursing care for duties such as bathing,
dressing, toileting and giving medications.20 Some states do not have separate requirements
for licensed nurses and direct-care nurses. Instead, they only impose a minimum require-
ment concerning total sta¢ ng. In this case, I take the federal sta¢ ng of 0.3 HPRD as the
minimum requirement for licensed nurses, and I take the di⁄erence of the total sta¢ ng and
0.3 HPRD as the requirement for direct-care nurses. Note that there is no speci￿c federal
requirement with respect to direct-care nurses.
19For example, a ratio of 1:10 nurse per resident was converted to 8 hours (for 1 full-time nurse working 8
hour per day) and divided by the number of residents (10) to determine that the total was0.8 HPRD. These
ratios were added for all three shifts during a day. A more detailed discussion of the conversion can be found
in Harrington (2001).
20Direct-care nurses provide 80-90 percent of the direct care to patients (Institute of Medicine, 1996).
More than 90 percent of direct-care nurses are women.
8States generally rely on the licensing process to monitor and enforce sta¢ ng require-
ments. As of 2005, 24 states, including the District of Columbia, had established a minimum
sta¢ ng ratio for licensed nurses that was higher than the federal ratio. The remaining
27 states followed the federal licensed nurse sta¢ ng requirements. In regard to minimum
sta¢ ng requirements for direct-care nurses, 34 states had established their own standards.
Regulations varied during our study period. Most of the changes were due to the adoption
of minimum sta¢ ng requirements for either licensed nurses or direct-care nurses. Ten of
the states, which had no requirements for licensed nurses in 1996, when the dataset began,
adopted standards by 2005, when the dataset ended. Similarly, nine states established re-
quirements for direct-care nurses during the time period studied here. Other states, including
Arizona and Missouri, dropped their sta¢ ng requirements for direct-care nurses. Detailed
information about regulatory policies can be found in the appendix, and Table 1 provides
summary statistics.
Table 1: Descriptive Minimum Sta¢ ng Requirements
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Regulation on Licensed Nurses (HPRD)
All Years 0.401 0.151 0.30 1.20
1997 0.372 0.113 0.30 0.66
2001 0.416 0.150 0.30 0.92
2004 0.429 0.190 0.30 1.20
Regulation on Direct Care Nurses (HPRD)
All Years 1.145 1.00 0 2.96
1997 0.932 0.918 0 2.40
2001 1.256 1.013 0 2.96
2004 1.301 1.059 0 2.96
Regulatory policy variables aremeasured at the state-year level. Total observation is 400 for 50 states
from 1997 to 2004.
3.2 Nursing Home OSCAR Files
Data on nursing home level variables comes from the federal On-Line Survey Certi￿cation
and Reporting System (OSCAR) between 1996 to 2005. OSCAR is based on a federal
9survey conducted by state licensure and certi￿cation agencies as part of the Medicare and/or
Medicaid certi￿cation process.21 The OSCAR data is collected every 9 to 15 months to verify
the compliance of nursing homes with all federal regulations. In implementing the survey,
state inspectors are trained to follow the federal standards for a common review process.
During each inspection visit, they observe nursing care and the interaction between sta⁄and
residents. They then ￿ll in a standard survey form to determine whether the visited nursing
home has met the federal Medicare and Medicaid quality and performance standards.22
OSCAR covers all the Medicare or Medicaid certi￿ed nursing homes, which account for
approximately 96 percent of all nursing facilities in the U.S. The dataset is considered the
greatest source of reliable and accurate information about U.S. nursing homes (Harrington,
Zimmerman, et al. 2000).
The OSCAR data is used to construct the key variables of interest for this study. First,
OSCAR provides detailed information such as the number of nursing beds in each facility, as
well as the number of patients in residence for each type of payment source in each facility.
Examining these variables helps to demonstrate how regulatory policies a⁄ect the supply and
demand side of the market. Second, the number of nursing home providers in each market
is identi￿ed through a nursing home￿ s presence and absence from the OSCAR data.23 In the
case of a mismatch of the identi￿cation of a nursing home, I use detailed location information
to match observations across years. Since each survey is done at an irregular interval of 9
to 15 months, our data identi￿es the number of nursing homes for the time period of 1997
to 2004.24 Last, quality is measured using de￿ciency citation data from OSCAR. De￿ciency
21The Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services contracts with each state to conduct the annual surveys.
Among the surveyors, there are trained health care professionals in nursing, nutrition, social work, pharmacy
and sanitation.
22Those standards cover many aspects of resident life, from specifying standards for the safe storage and
preparation of food to protecting residents from physical or mental abuse or inadequate care practices. There
are over 150 regulatory standards that nursing homes must meet at all times. Many are related.
23Strictly speaking, the OSCAR data are not comprehensive. The data do not cover nursing homes that
are not Medicare or Medicaid certi￿ed, which account for about 4 percent of all the nursing facilities in the
U.S. during the study period. As a result, the number of nursing homes identi￿ed through the OSCAR data
is only accurate for the majority of nursing homes that accept Medicare and Medicaid patients.
24For example, if a nursing home is not observed in the survey of 2005, I cannot identify whether it has
exited the market in 2005, or whether it has not exited, but its survey was going to be conducted sometime
10citations are issued to facilities by surveyors as part of the federal survey process.25 There
are 185 tags in total to cite, and each tag corresponds to one criterion related to the quality
of nursing home care. If the surveyed nursing home fails to meet or violates one particular
criterion, a corresponding de￿ciency citation will be issued. Further violations will incur
additional citations and therefore indicate a lower level of quality of care.
Nursing home care has many aspects, and quality of care is a multidimensional construct
(Mukamel and Spector, 2003). The existing literature has adopted a number of ways to
measure quality, and no generally accepted measure seems to exist. Besides the use of
de￿ciency citations, resource use and patient outcome are also used. However, the resource-
based measure has been criticized for its inability to determine whether the availability of
more resources implies improved quality or increased ine¢ ciency (Grabowski, 2001a). The
outcome-based measure relies on detailed risk-adjustments to infer quality, but data on risk-
adjustments is rather di¢ cult to obtain. Failing to control for heterogeneity in sickness
of patients across nursing homes may contaminate the quality measure. Because of these
reasons, many studies have adopted de￿ciency citations as the measure for quality of nursing
home care.26
Note that quality measures based on de￿ciency data have two major limitations. First,
there is concern about inter-surveyor variations and inconsistencies across states and over
time. This problem is mitigated by the fact that the Center of Medicare and Medicaid
Services has required surveyors to strictly adhere to the federal standards for a common
review process during each nursing home visit. In addition, our model has controlled for
the state ￿xed e⁄ects and state speci￿c trends. As a result, our estimation is robust to any
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and any time-variant heterogeneity that follows a
in 2006 (but I cannot observe the survey as our data ends in 2005).
25The process and the outcomes of nursing home care in 15 major areas are assessed by state surveyors.
Each of these areas has speci￿c regulations which state surveyors review to determine whether or not facilities
have met the standard. In July 1995, the Health Care Financing Administration consolidated the total of
325 tags (individual criteria) to a total of 185.
26Nyman 1985, 1988 and 1989; Grabowski 2001(a) and 2004; Mullan and Harrington, 2001; O￿ Neil et al.
2003; and Wiener et al. 2007.
11time trend. Second, a de￿ciency citation is issued for failing to meet a speci￿c standard, but
it does not di⁄erentiate between two nursing homes that do meet the standard (namely, this
would be the case if both nursing homes have zero de￿ciency citations). To this extent, it
does not capture quality variation as it exists above the federal standard.27
The quality measures used for this study is based on sta¢ ng related citations. Note that
some citations are not related to nurse sta¢ ng levels.28 Since our main interest is to examine
policy impacts of minimum sta¢ ng requirements, it is optimal to isolate those non-sta¢ ng
related citations for the calculation of our quality measure. However, there is no previous
literature analyzing which citations should be considered as sta¢ ng-related. In this study, I
simply di⁄erentiate between sta¢ ng and non-sta¢ ng related citations based on the detailed
tag information of each citation.29 I then focus on examining the sta¢ ng related citations in
the main estimation. As a robustness check, I also use the total de￿ciency citations as the
measure for quality of care, and the results are found to be consistent.
I adopt two methods to provide a quantitative measure for quality. The count measure
is represented (negatively) by the number of sta¢ ng related de￿ciency citations. The value
measure follows a weighting method used by Gannett News Service in which a score is
assigned to each de￿ciency based upon the citations￿scope and severity.30 Such measure
takes into account the di⁄erential severity of each violation. Similarly, data of the total
de￿ciency citations (the summation of sta¢ ng and non-sta¢ ng related citations) provides
two counterpart measures for overall quality. These two variables are used as instruments
for the estimation of the dynamic speci￿cation.
27For the county-level quality measure, less than 5 percent of the sample has a zero de￿ciency citation.
For the facility-level measure, roughly 15 percent has a zero de￿ciency rating.
28For example, an environment/cleaning violation will incur a citation, but it does not necessarily relate
to nurse sta¢ ng levels.
29Among all the tags, the following are considered as non-sta¢ ng related: F151-177 (resident rights), F201-
208 (admission, transfer and discharge rights), F360-372 (dietary services), F385-390 (physician services),
and F454-469 (physical environment).
30E⁄ective in July 1995, each de￿ciency is also rated on its scope and severity. An alphabetic score (from
A to L) is given to each de￿ciency based on the combination of the de￿ciency￿ s scope and severity indicator.
To calculate the value measure of citations, a de￿ciency with a scope and severity of D is scored as a 5,
whereas a de￿ciency with a scope and severity of K receives a score of 45. More detailed information can be
found at Matthews-Martin (2003).
12In addition to the quality measure at the nursing home level, I calculate the county-wide
quality as the average across all the nursing homes within a county. Although not shown in
this paper, another measure of the county-wide quality is weighted by the number of beds
per facility and this alternative quality measure provides quite similar results.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2 for the full sample and for selected years
between 2000 and 2004. Counties with missing values for demographics are deleted from the
sample so that the data covers a total of 3,073 counties in the U.S. during the time period
between 1997 to 2004. As a robustness check, I exclude 5 percent of the counties with more
than 18 nursing homes. Since the results are consistent, I only report the results using the
full sample. The data covers 2,507 counties for the study of quality, as observations which
lack information on de￿ciency citations or fail to include information about their severity
levels are also dropped.31 Note that I add a negative sign to the log transformed quality
measures so that a bigger value indicates better quality of care. Also, note that the value
of zero for quality measures represents no de￿ciency citations, indicating the highest level of
quality.
Table 2: Descriptive Establishment and Quality Measures
31Among the total of 3,073 counties, roughly 6 percent do not have any nursing homes, so they are not


























Non-Medicaid Patients Total number of patients minus total











Number of Observation 24,582 15,365
Count Quality Measure Count measure of nurse-staffing related





Value Quality Measure Value measure of nurse-staffing related

















Number of Observation 20,056 15,042
Count Quality Measure Count measure of nurse-staffing related





Value Quality Measure Value measure of nurse-staffing related





Number of Observation 125,054 74,787
All the variables are measured in natural logs (I add a negative sign to the log transformed quality measures.).
With the exception of the last two variables that are at the facility-year level, all the remaining variables are
measured at the county-year level.
3.3 ARF (2004) and Other Data
Data on market characteristics comes from the 2004 Area Resource File (ARF) and the
most recent population census. ARF collects variables on population characteristics, so-
cioeconomic features, and health care resources. Variables used in this analysis include the
average income, the size of the senior population, Medicare reimbursement rate and Medic-
aid nursing home reimbursement rate. Another controlled variable is the certi￿cate of need
(CON) policy at the state level. The CON policy requires nursing homes to obtain approval
from a state agency before they are permitted to open or expand an existing facility. The
policy claims to ration resources so that there will not be an uncontrolled growth of facilities.
14Previous analysis has found evidence that the CON policy restricts the supply of nursing
facilities and nursing beds (Scanlon, 1980; Harrington et al. 1997). Table 3 summarizes the
variables discussed above.32
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4 Empirical Speci￿cation
The main goal of this study is to identify the e⁄ects of minimum sta¢ ng requirements on
outcomes in the nursing home market. Minimum sta¢ ng requirements are represented both
as binary policy dummies and as continuous measures of minimum nursing hours per resident
day. The following work focuses on continuous measures; however, policy dummies provide
very similar results.
Considering that observations within each state are likely to be dependent, all of the
regressions are adjusted for clustering at the state-year level. Failure to account for clus-
tering may cause the researcher to greatly understate the standard errors on the estimated
coe¢ cients for the state-level variables (Moulton, 1990).
I present the basic speci￿cation in the following discussion. I then extend the basic
32Note that only three states (IN, NV, PA) changed their CON policy during the study period, and all
the changes happened before the year of 2000. This explains the minor di⁄erence in the statistics for CON
policy.
15speci￿cation by including state speci￿c trends. Finally, I provide a speci￿cation check to
assess the possibility of reverse causality that the imposition of the regulation is endogenous
response to other changes in the environment.
Dynamic Speci￿cation
The basic speci￿cation follows a dynamic model to estimate the potential impact of
regulatory policies. The outcome equation is written as:
Yist = ￿0 + ￿i + ￿s + ￿t + ￿Yist￿1 + MQSst ￿ ￿1 + Xist ￿ ￿2 + "ist (1)
where Yist represents various dependent variables at state s market i in time t, such as the
number of nursing homes and quality measures. The variable MQSst includes minimum
sta¢ ng requirements for licensed nurses and requirements for direct-care nurses. The two
policy variables are summarized by minimum nursing hours per resident day and they vary
at the state-year level. The coe¢ cients ￿1 are our primary research interests. The variable
Xist is the vector of variables representing market characteristics. Variables ￿i, ￿s and ￿t
are the market, state and time ￿xed e⁄ects, respectively.33
The basic speci￿cation extends the ￿xed e⁄ect speci￿cation with the inclusion of the
lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable. Such a dynamic speci￿cation accounts
for the possibility that the dependent variable of my interests may exhibit complex dynamic
behavior.34 A more structural justi￿cation for this speci￿cation is the existence of quality
adjustment costs in the nursing home industry. Nurses are the most important and the most
expensive inputs in nursing home production. Changing the level of quality in a nursing
33States vary substantially in the stringency concerning nursing home regulations. Furthermore, some
states have changed their regulations frequently enough that it is possible to use variation over time within
states to control for state ￿xed e⁄ects and to use variation across states within time to control for time-￿xed
e⁄ects. I exploit this across-state and over-time variation in state regulations to examine the impact of
minimum quality standards on behaviors of the nursing home market.
34One obvious advantage of this speci￿cation is that the lagged dependent variable can serve as a proxy
for factors which could potentially determine policy changes. For example, given a statewide problem of
deteriorating quality, a state government may be more likely to impose more stringent minimum sta¢ ng
requirements as a remedy. The ignorance of such factors would confound the estimates for the policy
impact.
16home generates disruption costs during retention and recruitment of nursing sta⁄, given a
current shortage of nurses at nationwide. If we think of quality as an investment decision,
the decision of having a certain quality at period t will depend on the stock of quality at
period t￿1. The dynamic speci￿cation captures state dependence concerning the quality of
nursing home care.
For the study of the supply of nursing homes in a market, costs of entry and exit must be
taken into account. On the entry side, the certi￿cate of need regulations impose barriers to
entry and therefore make entry more costly. On the exit side, the closure of a nursing home
usually involves costs such as obtaining approval of closure from the state and relocating
patients. As a result, a dynamic speci￿cation which includes the lagged number of the
nursing homes will be more appropriate.
The inclusion of year dummies provides controls for unobserved national attributes that
may a⁄ect the dependent and the policy variables. The inclusion of market (state) ￿xed
e⁄ects has two advantages. One advantage is that it provides controls for market (state)
heterogeneity that may a⁄ect the dependent variable, especially for the measure of quality of
nursing home care. Note that although quality information is drawn from the federal nursing
home surveys, survey teams that conduct those surveys may have their own discretion in
determining both the number and type of de￿ciency citations. Controlling for individual
speci￿c heterogeneity helps to mitigate the bias resulting from variation in survey process
across states and counties.35 The other advantage is that it provides controls for unobserved
time-invariant factors that may relate to policy changes across states. For example, a state
with persistently low quality of patient care may be more likely to adopt more stringent
minimum sta¢ ng requirements. If such heterogeneity is not taken care of, the estimation of
policy impacts will be downward biased.
Dynamic Speci￿cation with State Speci￿c Trends
35This speci￿cation captures the impact of policy changes on the deviations of quality measures from their
market averages. It only deals with time-invariant heterogeneity. The extended speci￿cation presented below
will add controls for additional heterogeneity that follows a time trend in quality measures.
17I extend the basic speci￿cation by adding state speci￿c trends, as shown in equation
(2).36 This helps to address the concern about inter-surveyor variations and inconsistencies
across states and over time. This speci￿cation is robust to any arbitrary heterogeneity that
follows a time trend across states. For example, a state￿ s increasing sensitivity to quality
issues may have caused surveyors to engage in more stringent inspections in their judgments
concerning de￿ciency citations during each survey visit. Such stringent inspections would
have systematically lowered the measure of quality. Moreover, if such state tends to adopt
stricter minimum sta¢ ng requirements, ignoring such heterogeneity would confound the
estimates for policy impacts to be downward biased. The dynamic speci￿cation with state
speci￿c trends is given as follows:
Yist = ￿0 + ￿i + ￿s + ￿t + ￿st + ￿Yist￿1 + MQSst ￿ ￿1 + Xist ￿ ￿2 + "ist (2)
To estimate the above two versions of the dynamic speci￿cation, I take the ￿rst-order
di⁄erence to get rid of the market and the state ￿xed e⁄ects. I then estimate the transformed
equation using the lagged dependent variables (Yist￿2 and/or Yist￿3) as the source of instru-
ments for ￿Yist￿1. Consistent estimation of the parameters requires that the error term "ist
be serially uncorrelated for the dynamic speci￿cation. I thus test serial correlation for ￿"ist
using the Arellano-Bond test (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The results lead to a rejection of
the correlation at order one but not at higher orders. I present the estimation details in the
next section.
In addition to the market level analysis discussed above, I also apply the dynamic model
to analyze how an individual nursing home changes its quality as a result of minimum
sta¢ ng requirements. Nursing homes of di⁄erential quality levels may respond to regulatory
policies in di⁄erent ways. For nursing homes of low quality, their initial sta¢ ng level may
be well below regulatory standards. Given the imposition of the standards, they will need
36Some recent works, such as Friedberg (1998), have shown the importance of including those individual
speci￿c trends.
18to increase nursing inputs to comply. However, for nursing homes of high quality, regulatory
standards may not be binding so that the imposition of standards may yield varying results.
High-quality nursing homes may choose to increase the quality of care so as to di⁄erentiate
themselves from their competitors (because those low-quality nursing homes have increased
their quality levels). It￿ s also likely that they may not have enough incentive to increase
quality as the costs of doing so might outweigh the bene￿ts, given that non-Medicaid patients
(the lucrative patients) only account for a small proportion of the overall demand. Nursing
homes cannot charge a higher price to Medicaid patients to recoup higher labor costs because
the price for Medicaid patients is set by the state government. As a result, nursing homes
may not ￿nd it pro￿table to increase their quality of care.
To allow for the possibility that regulatory policies may have di⁄erent types of impact
on the quality of patient care, depending on nursing homes￿initial quality levels of care,
I categorize nursing homes into di⁄erent groups based on their quality levels prior to any
policy changes. I then multiply the regulatory policies with the dummy variables of being
low and high quality nursing homes as shown in the following equation:
Yjist = ￿0+￿j+￿s+￿t+￿st+￿Yjist￿1+MQSst￿I(high)￿11+MQSst￿I(low)￿12+Xist￿￿2+"jist
(3)
where Yjist represents nursing home j at state s market i in time t. I de￿ne a nursing home
to be of low quality if its quality level is below the median of the quality of its state before
any regulatory change occurs in minimum sta¢ ng requirements. I have also used di⁄erent
thresholds. For example, I also de￿ne high quality to be above the 75th percentile of the
quality in that facility￿ s state, and I de￿ne medium quality to be below the 75th but above the
50th percentile. The parameters of interest are ￿11 and ￿12, where ￿11 and ￿12 are the vector
of parameters indicating how high-quality and low-quality nursing homes react to any policy
changes, respectively. Note that the estimation of the dynamic model relies on variation over
time within a nursing home to identify the parameters of interests. I cannot estimate the
19impact of time-invariant variables at the facility level (such as ownership). Instead, I assume
that those variables are controlled by the ￿xed e⁄ects.
Endogeneity Issues
There may exist other types of endogeneity that have not been addressed. For example,
there might be an artifact of a spurious correlation between the quality of nursing care
and the propensity of a state to adopt or change its regulatory policies regarding minimum
sta¢ ng requirements.
To further check for the existence of endogeneity problems in MQS policies, I include
in the dynamic speci￿cations an additional dummy variable for whether any policy changes
would take place in the subsequent year following the one being analyzed.37 Since two policy
variables are examined in this study, I allow the dummy variable to be one, whenever one
policy variable has changed in the subsequent year.38 I conduct the analysis at both the
county and the nursing home level. The estimated coe¢ cient on the lead dummy should
be insigni￿cant. Otherwise, there should be concerns about reverse causality from the left-
hand side variable to policy changes. A similar strategy has been employed by Gruber and
Hanratty (1995).
5 Results
This section presents and discusses the estimation results. All of the regressions are clustered
at the state-year level. In the interest of being concise, coe¢ cients for time dummies are not
presented. Tables 4 and 6 examine the impacts of minimum sta¢ ng requirements on the
37An earlier version of this paper has adopted two variables re￿ ecting trends in hospital nurse sta¢ ng
legislation as instruments for ￿MQSst: intro (whether sta¢ ng legislation for hospitals has been introduced
in a state in a particular year) and enact (whether sta¢ ng legislation for hospitals has been enacted in a
state in a particular year). However, the inclusion of these two instruments has caused imprecise estimates
for the parameters of interests. This is mainly caused by the lack of variation across state and over time in
those two instrumental variables.
38Another way to do this is to create two policy lead dummies, with one for each regulatory policy. The
results are found to be consistent. One reason that one policy lead (which summarizes any subsequent policy
change for the two types of regulations) is preferred is that the two lead dummies are highly correlated in
the data.
20number of nursing homes and on the number of patients at the county level. Their impacts
on the quality of care are presented in Tables 7 and 8, where Table 7 uses the number of
de￿ciency citations as the measure of quality, and Table 8 uses the value measure of quality.
Table 9 reports the estimation results of the quality of care at the nursing home level. In
addition, Table 5 provides results for the speci￿cation check that includes the policy lead
dummy to test for the reverse causality of policy regulations.
5.1 E⁄ects on the Number of Nursing Homes
Column 1 of Table 4 presents the estimation results with controls for the market ￿xed e⁄ects.
The coe¢ cient for the regulation on licensed nurses measures how a change of minimum
nursing hours for licensed nurses a⁄ects the number of nursing homes at the market level.
I ￿nd that regulations on licensed nurses and direct-care nurses have the opposite e⁄ects
on the number of nursing homes. If we assume both regulations negatively a⁄ect supply,
this result implies that regulations may have di⁄erent impacts on the quality of care so that
demand responds in opposite ways.
The remaining columns are the estimation results for the dynamic speci￿cation, with
columns 4 and 5 adding state speci￿c trends.39 Columns 2 and 4 of Table 1 use dl2:Yist￿2,
the di⁄erence of the lagged two-period Yist￿2 and the lagged three-period Yist￿3 number of
nursing homes, as the instrument for ￿Yist￿1. Columns 3 and 5 use Yist￿2 and Yist￿3 as
the instruments. In contrast to the ￿xed e⁄ect results, there are no longer any signi￿cant
impacts regarding minimum sta¢ ng requirements for licensed nurses and direct-care nurses.
This result alludes to the importance of including the lagged dependent variable in the model
speci￿cation, in addition to controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 5 reexamines the dynamic speci￿cations, with the inclusion of the policy lead
dummy variable. The ￿rst column is the estimation result for the case when the dependent
39Note that the ￿nal sample of the paper covers 3,073 counties from 1997 to 2004, which gives us a total of
24,584 observations for the estimation of the ￿xed e⁄ect speci￿cation at the county level. For the dynamic
speci￿cation, taking the ￿rst-order di⁄erence and using the lagged dependent variables as the instruments
reduces the sample size to 15,365.
21variable is the number of nursing home providers. The estimated coe¢ cient on the policy
lead dummy is insigni￿cant and very small in magnitude, suggesting that the causality goes
from policy changes to the dependent variable. The same results apply to the study of the
quality of patient care, as shown in columns 2 and 3. I will focus on the estimation results
from the dynamic speci￿cation for the remaining discussion of the paper.
Regulatory policies do not change the number of nursing homes but they may a⁄ect the
number of nursing beds in a market. To check this, I examine policy impacts on the total
supply of nursing beds in each market using the dynamic speci￿cation. The estimation result
is listed in column 1 of Table 6. Consistent with the results for the number of nursing homes,
I ￿nd no signi￿cant impact of minimum sta¢ ng requirements on the total supply of nursing
beds.
An exploration of policy impacts on the demand for nursing home care would be in-
teresting. As mentioned previously in this paper, nursing home demand is di⁄erentiated
according to its payment source. I divide nursing home patients into two categories: non-
Medicaid (private-pay and Medicare) patients and Medicaid patients. Medicaid patients are
paid for by the Medicaid program, in which the state government sets the reimbursement
rate. Given the fact that the Medicaid reimbursement rate is signi￿cantly lower than the
Medicare reimbursement rate and the private payment rate, nursing homes will give priority
to non-Medicaid patients and then ￿ll the remaining capacity with Medicaid patients (Ny-
man, 1985). I thus assume that demand from non-Medicaid patients is satis￿ed, even given
a nursing home￿ s capacity constraint (Grabowski, Gruber and Angelelli, forthcoming).
I follow the dynamic speci￿cation to estimate regulatory impacts on the number of non-
Medicaid and private-pay patients. The estimation is brie￿ y shown in columns 3 and 4
of Table 6. The results indicate that an extra half hour￿ s requirement for licensed nurses
increases the number of non-Medicaid patients by roughly 10 percent. I ￿nd similar results
for the number of private-pay patients. The imposition of quality standards on licensed
nurses may increase the quality of care provided at nursing homes, which in the end drives
22up the demand for nursing home care (Arrow, 1971).
I also study policy impacts on the number of total patients. The result is listed in column
2 of Table 6. I ￿nd regulatory policies do not have any signi￿cant impact on the total
patients in the market. The above results are consistent with the fact that nursing homes
have discretion as to which patients they choose to accept for admission (Grabowski, Gruber
and Angelelli, forthcoming). A nursing home with capacity constraints may choose ￿rst to
meet the increasing demand from non-Medicaid patients and then allocate its remaining beds
to Medicaid patients. This result implies that Medicaid patients may face more restricted
access to nursing homes given increased demand from non-Medicaid patients and no increase
in total market supply.
Finally, I examine the rate charged to private-pay patients given increased demand after
the imposition of regualtions on licensed nurses. If nursing homes prioritize private-pay
patients, regulation alone should not increase the rate for private-pay patients. To see this,
I collected the average private-pay rate at the state level using the MetLife market survey
between 2002 and 2006.40 I did a simple regression of the private-pay rate on regulation
policies, controlling for the state and time ￿xed e⁄ects. I found imposing regulation does not
sigini￿cantly increase private-pay rate.41 This ￿nding suggests that nursing homes compete
to ￿ll in their nurisng beds with non-Medicaid patients.
In conclusion, minimum quality standards have no signi￿cant e⁄ects on the number of
nursing home providers and on the number of nursing beds at the county level. Based on
the above reduced form analysis, I cannot make any inferences regarding regulatory impacts
on the behavior of either the demand or the supply side of the market. But since demand
from non-Medicaid patients increases signi￿cantly, there must exist factors which restrict the
supply side of the market. One possible factor is that the imposition of quality standards
requires higher nursing input, thereby increasing costs. Given that the majority of the
40The annual report is titled as MetLife market survey on nursing homes and home care costs, which is
available at the MetLife website.
41I consider this analysis as preliminary. A more rigorous examination would be using private-pay rate at
the nursing home level, which is out of the scope of the current study.
23patients are paid for by the Medicaid program at a set rate, nursing homes may not ￿nd
it pro￿table to enter the market or to expand their existing capacities. As a result, supply
does not respond to the increasing demand and potential Medicaid patients may not be able
to gain access to nursing home care. I relate the other factors to the state-level certi￿cate
of need program and construction moratorium laws. Those regulations impose barriers to
entry by constraining the number of nursing homes and the number of nursing beds in the
marketplace (Scanlon, 1980). To sum up, the responsiveness of the supply side of the market
has lead to nonsigni￿cant impact on the number of nursing homes.
Our estimations also indicate that the size of the elderly population is an important
determinant for the number of nursing homes. Note that the variable certi￿cate of need
program is dropped out of the analysis for the dynamic speci￿cation because of the lack of
variation within states during the sample period (2000-2004). As a result, its impact gets
picked up by the state ￿xed e⁄ects.
5.2 E⁄ects on Quality
This section explains regulatory impacts on the quality of patient care. Estimation results
are presented in Tables 7 and 8, where quality is measured as the count and as the value
of de￿ciency citations, respectively. Since the two tables deliver quite consistent results, my
discussion will focus on Table 7. Column 1 corresponds to the basic ￿xed e⁄ect speci￿cation.
Both regulatory policies are found to have no signi￿cant impacts on quality of care.
The results of the dynamic speci￿cation are shown in Columns 2 through 5, where
columns 4 and 5 correspond to the dynamic speci￿cation with the inclusion of state speci￿c
trends. Columns 2 and 4 use the lagged two-period quality measure Yist￿2 as the instrument
for ￿Yist￿1; Columns 3 and 5 use Yist￿2 and the lagged two-period overall quality measure
as the instruments.42 Note that, throughout the paper, the quality of care, as the dependent
42The overall quality measure is correlated to the measure of quality of care because both can be considered
as decisions made within the same nursing facility, or as the survey outcomes delivered by the same survey
team.
24variable, is measured using sta¢ ng related de￿ciency citations. The overall quality measure
(using both sta¢ ng and non-sta¢ ng related de￿ciency citations) provides quite consistent
results, which are not reported in the paper.
The estimation results have delivered quite important information. First, I do ￿nd evi-
dence of high state dependence in quality of patient care. Second, I ￿nd that ignoring state
speci￿c trends tend to underestimate policy impacts on quality of care. For example, the es-
timated coe¢ cient for the regulation on licensed nurses is 0.32 for the dynamic speci￿cation
and it goes up to 0.52 for the dynamic speci￿cation with state speci￿c trends. Using both
the count and the value measures of de￿ciency citations (those related to nurse sta¢ ng),
I ￿nd signi￿cant improvement in quality as a result of minimum sta¢ ng requirements for
licensed nurses. To be more speci￿c, an extra half hour￿ s sta¢ ng requirement for licensed
nurses increases quality of care by 25 percent if quality is count-measured, and by 30 per-
cent if quality is value-measured. This quality-increasing e⁄ect is consistent with previous
research ￿ndings that more licensed nurses improve quality (Munroe, 1990; Schnelle et al.
2004; Zhang and Grabowski, 2004). Note that quality measures are rescaled so that a pos-
itive coe¢ cient indicates a quality increasing e⁄ect. As opposed to the impact of licensed
nurses, the estimated parameters for direct-care nurses remain insigni￿cant. A more detailed
discussion about this lack of impact will be provided in the next section.
The above analysis is based on the average quality measure for a given market. It is also
interesting to examine how individual nursing homes adjust their quality levels in response
to regulatory policies. To observe this, I conduct an analysis at the nursing home level using
the dynamic speci￿cation with state speci￿c trends. I di⁄erentiate nursing homes based on
their initial quality levels prior to any regulatory changes.43 For a state that has experienced
any policy changes, I ￿rst identify the year when the ￿rst policy change was taken place. I
use observations of the years prior to the year of the ￿rst change to de￿ne its initial quality
43The estimation results at the nursing home level without di⁄erentiating quality of care are consistent
with those at the county level. I thus focus on studying how nursing homes of di⁄erential quality respond
to regulatory changes.
25level for a nursing home. To be more speci￿c, a nursing home is considered to be high
(low) quality if the median of its quality levels (measured using the count and the value of
citations for years prior to any policy change) is higher (lower) than the 50th percentile of
the distribution in its state.44
The results are listed in Table 9. Column 1 shows that the regulation on licensed nurses
has smaller impact on high-quality nursing homes. Column 2 di⁄erentiates among nursing
homes of high (prior quality, as it is determined to be above the 75th percentile of the
distribution in its state), medium and low quality (prior quality is below the 50 percentile
of the distribution).45 I ￿nd that nursing homes of a low-quality level are more a⁄ected
than those of medium quality. For example, nursing homes at the bottom of the quality
distribution increase quality by more than 30 percent, given a half hour￿ s increase in minimum
nursing hours for licensed nurses. In addition, I ￿nd regulations on direct-care nurses have
no signi￿cant impact. Columns 3 and 4 list the results for the value quality measure, which
are consistent with the results for the count quality measure displayed in Columns 1 and 2.
The analysis at the facility level con￿rms the results based on the market level analysis.
Moreover, it provides insights into how nursing homes of di⁄erential quality levels respond to
policy changes. The result indicates that the increase in quality of care after the imposition
of minimum sta¢ ng requirements for licensed nurses is mainly driven by low-quality nursing
homes improving their quality to meet the new standards. However, regulatory policies
may not be binding for high-quality nursing homes. Given that the industry is dominated
by Medicaid patients, high-quality nursing homes do not have enough incentive to increase
their quality of care to di⁄erentiate themselves from their competitors, even given the fact
that the degree of quality di⁄erentiation is reduced as the result of their competitors having
increased their quality levels.
Medicare reimbursement rates are positively correlated to both measures of quality of
44For the control states without any policy changes, I use the median of a nursing home￿ s quality levels
(across the study period) to the quality distribution in its state.
45The cuto⁄ used to de￿ne quality levels seems a little arbitrary. As a robustness check, I also de￿ne high
quality as above 50th percentile and low quality as below 25th percentile. The results remain consistent.
26care. The Medicaid reimbursement rate is found to have a negative e⁄ect on quality. This
￿nding is opposite to some recent work such as a study by Grabowski (2001b), but consistent
with other previous work such as that conducted by Nyman (1985) and Gertler (1989).
I now summarize the impact of minimum sta¢ ng requirements. In terms of quality,
the imposition of minimum sta¢ ng requirements for licensed nurses improves the quality of
care. I ￿nd that a half-hour increase in minimum nursing hours per resident day for licensed
nurses improves the average quality by 25 percent if quality is measured as a de￿ciency
count, and by 30 percent if quality is measured as a de￿ciency value. I also ￿nd that this
quality-increasing e⁄ect is mainly driven by those nursing homes which were initially at the
low-quality end of the spectrum, as they must increase their quality of care to meet the new
standards. This signi￿cant quality-increasing e⁄ect of licensed nurses can be due to the fact
that licensed nurses play a supervisory role in nursing home environments, and it is very
likely that increased sta¢ ng at the licensed nurse level is e⁄ective in increasing the overall
quality of care. This result is consistent with previous ￿ndings.46 In terms of welfare, the
regulation on minimum sta¢ ng requirements for licensed nurses increases welfare for non-
Medicaid patients as a result of improved quality of patient care. It is not clear whether
Medicaid patients are better o⁄ or worse o⁄ based on the impact of regulatory standards.
On the one hand, welfare increases due to improved quality. On the other hand, welfare
decreases as Medicaid patients face more limited access to nursing home care.
6 Discussion
Considering the important role that nurses (both licensed nurses and direct-care nurses)
play in providing quality health care, quality is expected to increase after the imposition of
minimum sta¢ ng requirements. This can be part of the reason that states rely on imposing
a lower bound of sta¢ ng to ￿x the deterioration of quality in the nursing home industry.
46Such as Munroe (1990), Cohen and Spector (1996), Schnelle et al. (2004), and Zhang and Grabowski
(2004).
27Minimum sta¢ ng requirements for licensed nurses and direct-care nurses were examined sep-
arately, and it was found that, whereas minimum sta¢ ng requirements for licensed nurses
increase the quality of patient care, similar requirements for direct-care nurses have no sig-
ni￿cant impact.
Imposing minimum sta¢ ng requirements for direct-care nurses does not necessarily im-
prove quality. One possible explanation is related to the incentive for nursing homes to
substitute less expensive laborers to reduce their operating costs in order to comply with
minimum sta¢ ng requirements. Labor expenses constitute the largest component of a nurs-
ing home￿ s operating expenses (Grabowski, 2001a). The imposition of minimum sta¢ ng
requirements increases labor costs and one unintended consequence is that nursing homes
may sacri￿ce quality for quantity to maintain their labor costs. The distinction in policy im-
pacts from licensed nurses and direct-care nurses can be explained by the di⁄erence between
the two labor markets: Nursing homes are more likely to hire less expensive and less skilled
substitutes for direct-care nurses as compared to licensed nurses.
The training and certi￿cation for licensed nurses and direct-care nurses is quite di⁄erent.
To become a certi￿ed registered nurse, an individual has to obtain a degree in registered
nursing (which normally takes 2-3 years to complete) and pass a national licensing exam-
ination. In this sense, the quality of licensed nurses can be guaranteed. On the contrary,
for the profession of direct-care nurses, the current certi￿cation requirement is minimal: a
minimum of 75 hours of entry-level training, 12 hours of supervised clinical training, and a
competency exam within 4 months of employment. Many nursing homes provide their own
free training program to their job candidates. The lack of strict training and certi￿cation
in this profession makes it possible for nursing homes to hire less expensive and less skilled
laborers as substitutes for direct-care nurses.47 Nursing homes may also have incentives to
47One characteristic of the direct-care nursing labor market is a very high turnover rate caused by low
salaries, few bene￿ts and a heavy workload. A report by the American Health Care Association shows that
the turnover rate for certi￿cate nurse aids was over 71 percent in 2002 nationwide. "Average annual CNA
turnover rates were below 40 percent in only 4 percent of states, and 60 percent or less in only 35 percent
of states. CNA turnover rates exceed 60 percent in 65 percent of states, exceed 80 percent in 37 percent of
states, and were above 100 percent in 20 percent of states." (Decker et al., 2003)
28force overtime work,48 which will deteriorate the quality of care as well.
To ￿nd evidence for the above explanation, I collected data on hourly wages from 1997
to 2005 for licensed nurse and direct-care nurses using the occupational employment sta-
tistics by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.49 I found that regulations on licensed nurses
positively a⁄ect the hourly wage for licensed nurses. However regulations on direct-care
nurses have negative but insigni￿cant impact on hourly wage for direct-care nurses. This
analysis, although preliminary, suggests that minimum sta¢ ng requirements a⁄ect the two
labor markets di⁄erently. In the labor market for licensed nurses, regulation increases the
demand for licensed nurses and as a result, wage goes up. However, the labor market for
direct-care nurses has experienced no such increase in wages. This result is consistent with
the hypothesis that nursing homes circumventing this regulation by hiring less expensive and
less skilled laborers as substitutes for direct-care nurses.
To summarize, mandating quantity of care does not necessarily guarantee the overall
quality of care. The neglect of quality in direct-care nurses undermines the quality of patient
care.
7 Conclusion
This article empirically examines the impact of minimum sta¢ ng requirements on the nursing
home market using a unique national panel over the time period between 1996 and 2005. It
shows the importance to add comprehensive controls for unobserved heterogeneity. It also
highlights the value of allowing for state dependence in examining policy impacts on the
48According to a national survey on compliance with minimum wage, overtime and child labor violations
in nursing homes, only 40 percent of the sample was in compliance with these requirements in 2000, while
the compliance rate was 70 percent in 1997 (General Accounting O¢ ce, 2001).
49The occupational employment statistics provides hourly wage estimates (mean and median) for over 800
occupations for all the states in the U.S. The data are available at the Bureau of Labor Statistics website. I
drew wage data on licensed nurses using registered nurses (occupation code: 29-1111 ) and licensed practical
and vocational nurses (occupational code: 29-2061), and data on direct care nurses using nursing aides,
orderlies and attendants (occupation code: 31-1012). To examine how regulatory policies a⁄ect wages of
nurses, I ran regressions of the hourly wage on regulatory policies, controlling for the state and time ￿xed
e⁄ect.
29quality of patient care and on the behavior of entry and exit in the nursing home industry.
The estimation reveals a quality-improving e⁄ect from the minimum sta¢ ng requirement for
licensed nurses: A half-hour increase in the minimum nursing hours per resident day increases
quality by 25 percent. Equivalently, it indicates that one standard deviation increase of
minimum licensed nursing hours will improve quality by eight percent. There is no evidence
of any impact from the minimum sta¢ ng requirement for direct-care nurses. This ￿nding
has an important policy implication: Mandating the quantity of direct-care nursing does not
guarantee the quality of care.
Because this paper takes a reduced form analysis to identify policy impacts, it does
not explicitly model any interaction among competing nursing homes. Given the high state
dependence observed in the estimation, an interesting extension would be to adopt a dynamic
framework and structurally model nursing homes￿strategic interactions in terms of quality
decisions and the behavior of entry and exit.
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35Table 4: E⁄ects on the Number of Nursing Homes
The Number of Nursing Homes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regulation on Licensed Nurses 0.1151*** 0.0019 -0.0016 0.0003 -0.0092
(0.0411) (0.0207) (0.0213) (0.0199) (0.0199)
Regulation on Direct Care Nurses -0.0175** -0.0012 0.0021 0.0030 0.0042
(0.0083) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0033)
Lag Dependent Variable 0.1007** 0.1293** 0.1102** 0.1317***
(0.0497) (0.0520) (0.0489) (0.0507)
Ln(Income) 0.0113 -0.0226 -0.0205 -0.0237 -0.0197
(0.0184) (0.0173) (0.0176) (0.0168) (0.0171)
Ln(Elder) 0.0996*** 0.0447** 0.0501** 0.0460** 0.0523***
(0.0167) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0197)
Medicare Rate -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Medicaid Rate -0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0004**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Certificate of Need 0.0037
(0.0065)
Constant 0.6251** -0.0106*** -0.0136*** -0.0035 -0.0047
(0.2481) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0058) (0.0069)
State (market) fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged dependent variable N Y Y Y Y
State specific trends N N N Y Y
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state-year level, are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N=24584 (3073 counties, from
1997 to 2004). Columns 2 and 4 use the difference of the lagged two-period and the lagged three-period dependent variable as the instrument
for the first-difference transformed equation. Columns 3 and 5 use the value of the lagged two-period and the lagged three-period dependent
variables as the instruments.









Regulation on Licensed Nurses 0.0061 0.2877** 0.3334**
(0.0188) (0.1433) (0.1689)
Regulation on Direct Care Nurses 0.0016 0.0076 0.0268
(0.0025) (0.0343) (0.0434)
Lead Policy Dummy 0.0063 -0.0308 -0.0845
(0.0048) (0.0442) (0.0563)
Lag Dependent Variable 0.1000** 0.2151*** 0.1461***
(0.0499) (0.0262) (0.0223)
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state-year level, are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
N=24584 (3073 counties, 1997-2004) for column (1), 20056 (2507 counties, 1997-2004) for columns (2) and
(3). All the columns are based on the dynamic specification and they all use the lagged two-period dependent
variable as the instrument.







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regulation on Licensed Nurses 0.1529 0.1716 0.1983** 0.1957**
(0.1060) (0.1044) (0.0857) (0.0880)
Regulation on Direct Care Nurses -0.0106 -0.0201 -0.0299 -0.0293
(0.0328) (0.0331) (0.0294) (0.0283)
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state-year level, are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N=24584 (3073
counties, from 1997 to 2004). All the columns are based on the dynamic specification and they all use the lagged two-period and
the lagged three-period dependent variables as the instruments.
Table 7: E⁄ects on the Quality of Care, Measured by Citation Counts
The Count Quality Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regulation on Licensed Nurses 0.0745 0.3161** 0.3307** 0.5242*** 0.5285***
(0.1444) (0.1485) (0.1480) (0.1274) (0.1273)
Regulation on Direct Care Nurses 0.0548 0.0212 0.0208 -0.0229 -0.0235
(0.0353) (0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0385) (0.0385)
Lag Dependent Variable 0.2147*** 0.2131*** 0.1650*** 0.1655***
(0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0229) (0.0229)
Ln(Income) 0.2620 0.1774 0.1694 0.1882 0.1808
(0.2120) (0.2762) (0.2761) (0.2660) (0.2659)
Ln(Elder) -0.3776** 0.1449 0.0846 0.2067 0.1762
(0.1651) (0.2650) (0.2605) (0.2599) (0.2567)
Medicare Rate 0.0141*** 0.0058** 0.0066*** 0.0057*** 0.0059***
(0.0008) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0021)
Medicaid Rate -0.0052** -0.0038 -0.0040 -0.0044* -0.0046*
(0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Certificate of Need -0.0846***
(0.0288)
Constant -4.4171* -0.1272* -0.1426* -0.2093 -0.2083
(2.5129) (0.0751) (0.0741) (0.2638) (0.2638)
State (market) fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged dependent variable N Y Y Y Y
State specific trends N N N Y Y
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state-year level, are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N=20056 (2507 counties,
from 1997 to 2004). Columns 2 and 4 use the lagged two-period dependent variable as the instrument. Columns 3 and 5 use the lagged
two-period dependent variable and the lagged two-period overall quality measure as the instruments.
37Table 8: E⁄ects on the Quality of Care, Measured by Citation Values
The Value Quality Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regulation on Licensed Nurses 0.2461 0.4115** 0.4231** 0.6350*** 0.6428***
(0.1976) (0.2027) (0.2024) (0.1699) (0.1697)
Regulation on Direct Care Nurses 0.0702 0.0642 0.0636 -0.0035 -0.0048
(0.0592) (0.0443) (0.0443) (0.0550) (0.0550)
Lag Dependent Variable 0.1454*** 0.1437*** 0.1198*** 0.1186***
(0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0202) (0.0202)
Ln(Income) 0.3830 0.2840 0.2593 0.2885 0.2658
(0.2905) (0.4234) (0.4228) (0.4209) (0.4203)
Ln(Elder) -0.3777* 0.4848 0.3875 0.5243 0.4488
(0.1929) (0.4016) (0.3930) (0.4060) (0.3993)
Medicare Rate 0.0150*** 0.0072*** 0.0076*** 0.0072*** 0.0074***
(0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Medicaid Rate -0.0039 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0035 -0.0037
(0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Certificate of Need -0.1304***
(0.0501)
Constant -7.4241** -0.0521 -0.0557 -0.1719 -0.1428
(3.3233) (0.0767) (0.0766) (0.4735) (0.4726)
State (market) fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Lagged dependent variable N Y Y Y Y
State specific trends N N N Y Y
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state-year level, are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N=20056 (2507 counties,
from 1997 to 2004). Columns 2 and 4 use the lagged two-period dependent variable as the instrument. Columns 3 and 5 use the lagged
two-period dependent variable and the lagged two-period overall quality measure as the instruments.
38Table 9: E⁄ect on the Quality of Care, at the Nursing Home Level
Count Quality Measure Value Quality Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regulation on Licensed Nurses x 0.2480** 0.0955 0.3373 -0.0515
High Quality (0.1146) (0.2341) (0.2249) (0.6442)
Regulation on Licensed Nurses x 0.3310*** 0.5346***
Medium Quality (0.1092) (0.2022)
Regulation on Licensed Nurses x 0.6982*** 0.6934*** 0.7671** 0.7537**
Low Quality (0.2005) (0.1990) (0.3569) (0.3549)
Regulation on Direct Care Nurses x 0.0153 0.0072 -0.0096 -0.0862
High Quality (0.0660) (0.0826) (0.1168) (0.1699)
Regulation on Direct Care Nurses x 0.0209 0.0576
Medium Quality (0.0663) (0.1119)
Regulation on Direct Care Nurses x 0.0413 0.0395 0.0582 0.0476
Low Quality (0.0791) (0.0789) (0.1338) (0.1335)
Lag Dependent Variable 0.0924*** 0.0921*** 0.0837*** 0.0829***
(0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0081) (0.0081)
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state-year level, are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N=74787 at the facility-
year level. All the columns are based on the dynamic specification with state specific trends and they all use the lagged two-period
dependent variable as the instrument.
39Appendix:
Table A1: Regulations on Minmimum Nursing Hours
Regulation on Regulation on Regulation on Regulation on
State Year  Licensed Nurses  Direct-Care Nurses State Year  Licensed Nurses  Direct-Care Nurses
AK 1997 0.32 0 MO 1997 0.3 1.43
AL 1997 0.3 0 MO 1998 0.3 0
AR 1997 0.3 0 MS 1997 0.3 1.9
AR 2001 0.48 2.44 MS 2000 0.48 2.32
AR 2003 0.48 2.64 MT 1997 0.64 0.56
AZ 1997 0.54 0 NC 1997 0.3 1.8
CA 1997 0.3 2.4 ND 1997 0.3 0
CA 1999 0.3 2.5 NE 1997 0.3 0
CA 2000 0.3 2.96 NH 1997 0.3 0
CO 1997 0.48 1.76 NJ 1997 0.56 2
CT 1997 0.64 1.32 NM 1997 0.3 0
DE 1997 0.3 2.2 NM 2000 0.3 2.26
DE 2001 0.92 2.08 NV 1997 0.32 0
DE 2002 1.08 2.2 NY 1997 0.56 0
DE 2003 1.2 2.47 OH 1997 0.3 1.3
FL 1997 0.3 0 OH 2001 0.8 1.7
FL 2001 0.6 1.7 OK 1997 0.32 1.48
FL 2002 1 2.3 OK 2000 0.32 1.82
FL 2003 1 2.6 OK 2001 0.32 2.12
FL 2004 1 2.9 OK 2002 0.32 2.54
GA 1997 0.3 0 OR 1997 0.32 1.65
GA 1998 0.3 2.2 PA 1997 0.3 2.2
HI 1997 0.3 0 PA 1999 0.3 2.4
IA 1997 0.32 0.96 RI 1997 0.3 0
IA 2000 0.4 1.6 SC 1997 0.3 1.62
ID 1997 0.38 2.4 SC 1999 0.56 1.87
IL 1997 0.56 2 SD 1997 0.3 0
IN 1997 0.56 0 TN 1997 0.4 1.6
KS 1997 0.32 1.74 TX 1997 0.46 0
KY 1997 0.3 0 UT 1997 0.3 0
LA 1997 0.3 0 VA 1997 0.3 0
LA 1998 0.3 2.3 VT 1997 0.3 0
MA 1997 0.66 2 VT 2001 0.3 2.7
MD 1997 0.3 1.76 WA 1997 0.3 0
ME 1997 0.56 1.5 WI 1997 0.45 1.8
ME 2001 0.56 2.34 WI 1998 0.5 2
MI 1997 0.3 2.01 WV 1997 0.46 1.6
MN 1997 0.3 1.76 WY 1997 0.38 1.87
Note: Regulatory standards are converted to nursing hours per resident day for a 100-bed
nursing facility according to Harrington (2001). If a state has only one observation at the
year of 1997, it indicates no policy changes during the study period.
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